


































Hermann Remsperger, Volker W. Wieland, Michael Sachs, and Theodor Baums 
eds., Zentralbanken, Währungsunion und stabiles Finanzsystem: Festschrift für 
Helmut Siekmann 637 (Berlin 2019); Tax Notes International, reprint Forthcoming 
Henry Ordower, Impact of Taxation on Immigration  Page 1 




Rules governing admission of immigrants to stable, developed countries vary widely among 
countries, yet wealthy and highly educated immigrants receive favorable admission decisions 
from immigration authorities more frequently than do conflict and economic refugees.  Wealthy 
individuals tend to receive quick and favorable admission decisions even if they differ ethnically, 
racially and religiously from the majority populace.
2
  As preferred immigration destination 
countries limit the number of immigrants they will admit -- the U.S. certainly does --, admissions 
are likely to follow a hierarchy based on expectations that certain immigrants will contribute 
significantly to the economy and welfare of the destination country in a manner that 
distinguishes him or her from other applicants for admission.
3
  Admission standards and 
practices also may favor some applicants over others on the basis of race, religion, and country 
of origin.
4
  Immigration has changed the face of many economically developed countries and 
introduced a diversity of cultures into formerly homogeneous monocultures.
5
   
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; A.B. Washington University, M.A., 
J.D. The University of Chicago. Published in Hermann Remsperger, Volker W. Wieland, 
Michael Sachs, and Theodor Baums eds., Zentralbanken, Währungsunion und stabiles 
Finanzsystem: Festschrift für Helmut Siekmann 637 (Duncker und Humblot Berlin, 2019). A 
revised and expanded exploration of this general topic will appear as Immigration, Emigration, 
Fungible Labor and the Retreat from Progressive Taxation in Peter Harris and Dominic De 
Cogan, ed., Tax Justice and Tax Law: Understanding Unfairness in Tax Systems, ch. 8, 133 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing forthcoming 2020). 
2
 Leila Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant Investment Programs, 62 Saint Louis U. L. 
Rev. 121 (2017), Allison Christians, Buying In:  Residence and Citizenship by Investment, 62 
Saint Louis U. L. Rev. 51 (2017). 
3
 The U.S. historically has maintained a family based immigration system as its principal method 
for legal, permanent immigration under 8 U.S.C. §1151 et seq.  The statute also includes other 
categories of immigrants with lower priority including exceptional individuals, those with critical 
skills and education and certain unskilled workers but not seasonal workers.  Categories other 
than family immigration are “merit-based.”  USCIS, Green Card Eligibility Category 1 available 
at https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/eligibility-categories.There is also a category for diversity 
immigration but within the category candidates are scored on the merit criteria. 
4
 In the U.S., categories of immigrants have become less predictable during the Trump 
administration, as President Trump overtly has sought to sub-classify immigrants by racial, 
religious and ethnic limitations within the various classes.  Early in his presidential tenure, 
President Trump sought to impose a ban on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries.  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Executive Orders on Protecting the Homeland, available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/executive-orders-protecting-homeland (last visited December 3, 2018).   
5
 Sweden, for example.  Hans-Ingvar Roth /Fredrik Hertzberg, Tolerance and Cultural Diversity 
in Sweden 10, European Union Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
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Conflict zones and weak economies drive immigration from those areas to wealthier and more 
stable areas. At the same time, high taxes and regulation fuel emigration from wealthy stable 
economies to lower tax, less regulated jurisdictions.  Labor flight to lower tax jurisdictions 
historically has not been prevalent because rendition of services has been location dependent.  
However, the rapid growth of technology has made many industries independent of the location 
of their service providers.
6
  Cross-border competition for some labor has grown.  While top 
scientists and medical professionals have been in demand since at least the early years of the 20
th
 
century, demand for technology expertise has accompanied growing international reliance on 
technology.  The emergence of English as a common, international language has removed 
linguistic barriers to international commerce and individuals with technical training and expertise 
are able both to work remotely and relocate.  Competition in many realms has become 
international and less developed countries which have devoted their limited resources to 
educating and training their citizens to develop that expertise and skill are concerned about 




This paper explores the role that taxation plays in the movement of people and capital.  Part I 
addresses the relationship between taxes and retention of capital, including tax incentives for 
capital investment, shifting tax burdens from capital to labor, and rules preventing the escape of 
capital from its current taxing jurisdiction.  Part II considers how taxes supplement immigration 
policy to attract capital currently outside the jurisdiction.  Part III contemplates whether taxes 
play any significant role in attracting
8
 or retaining skilled labor.
9
  Part IV looks at taxes and tax 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.academia.edu/664630/Tolerance_and_Cultural_Diversity_in_Sweden).  And further 
in Sweden on the failure to integrate and cultural misunderstanding:  Paulina de los Reyes , ed., 
Om välfärdens gränser och det villkorade medborgarskapet:  Rapport av Utredningen om makt, 
integration och strukturell diskriminering, 2006 Statens Offentliga Utredningar (Public 
Investigations of the State)  37  (Title translation:  Concerning the limits of welfare and 
conditional citizenship:  Report on the investigation of power, integration, and structural 
discrimination) (author’s translation). 
6
 Call centers for product support or marketing are obvious examples and many technological 
services often lend themselves to remote contact between clients and providers. 
7
 E.g. Yariv Brauner, Brain Drain Taxation as Development Policy, 55 Saint Louis U L J 221 
(2010); Matthew Lister, A Tax-Credit Approach to Addressing Brain Drain, 62 Saint Louis U LJ 
63 (2017).  Cuba, for example, trains many, high quality medical professionals and contracts to 
supply medical professionals to other Latin American countries while paying low wages and 
retaining payments in excess of the salaries.  Shasta Darlington, Cuba Is Pulling Doctors From 




 Pierre-Régis Dukmedjian/Nadejda Girleanu, Luxembourg Offers Tax Incentives to Attract 
Highly Skilled Employees, Tax Notes (Dec. 6, 2018), available at 
https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/employment-taxes/luxembourg-offers-tax-
incentives-attract-highly-skilled-employees/2018/12/06/28l6b.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648682
Henry Ordower, Impact of Taxation on Immigration  Page 3 
trends and identifies how they disadvantage or benefit fungible, frequently immigrant labor.
10
  
Part V concludes that capital tax rate competition seems unlikely to prevent capital flight as it 
inquires whether anti-immigration and anti-immigrant public sentiment has contributed to the 
shift of tax burdens from capital to labor.  
I.  Retaining Rich People and their Capital. 
As global competition for capital increased in the latter decades of the 20
th
 century, the steeply 
progressive income taxes with high maximum rates of tax characteristic of developed countries 
during the middle years of the 20
th
 century yielded to systems with moderate or flat progression 
and moderate maximum rates of tax.
11
   Taxes also have tended to increase on less mobile 
income from labor and to decrease on more mobile income from property.
12
  Periodic wealth 
taxes and gift and estate taxes on the transmission of wealth similarly have declined or 
disappeared.
13
  Such changes in rates and tax structures may discourage wealthy individuals from 
emigrating and settling in lower taxed countries or transferring their income producing personal 
property to low taxed jurisdictions.
14
    
Decline in maximum rates of tax and occasionally complete disappearance of taxes on 
transmission of wealth have limited impact on funding of governmental services and public 
benefits.  While steeply progressive taxes are associated historically with public benefits and 
welfare states, even confiscatory taxes on the wealthiest residents are unlikely to yield sufficient 
revenue to maintain extensive governmental functions and services.  The general populace must 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 Supra note 7 for literature examples. 
10
 Defined and discussed infra in part IV. 
11




 In 1976 estates in excess of $600,000 were subject to estate tax but in 2018 estates become 
taxable only in excess of $10,000.  Section 2010 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,  as 
amended (the “Code”), 26 U.S.C. §2010 (exemption from tax). In the following sections of the 
Code will be referred to as I.R.C. § followed by a number. The maximum estate tax rate in the 
U.S. for example declined from 77 percent of taxable estates in excess of $10 million in 1976 to 
40 percent of taxable estates in excess of $11 million.  I.R.C. §2001.  Sweden repealed its 
inheritance tax in early 2005, retroactively to December 17, 2004 (source available at  
http://www.arvsskatt.nu/index.php?page_id=22&lang_id=1) and its wealth tax in December 
2007 retroactively to January 1, 2007.  Ekonomifakta, Förmögenhetsskatt (available at 
http://www.ekonomifakta.se/sv/Fakta/Skatter/Skatt-pa-fastigheter-och-
formogenhet/Formogenhetsskatt/).  Sweden is unusual among OECD members in not having an 
inheritance or estate tax.  Sveriges Riksdag, Motion 2013/14:Sk403 Arvsskatt och 
förmögenhetsskatt (October 3, 2013) (available http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-
Lagar/Forslag/Motioner/mot-201314Sk403-Arvsskatt-oc_H102Sk403/).  
14
 For some taxpayers decreased rates of tax are not sufficient.  The U.S. experience suggests that 
taxpayers seek to avoid even very low taxes.  Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 
Saint Louis U L J 47 (2010). 
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provide the revenue to fund the demands of modern governments.
15
  The policy supporting 
steeply progressive and high income tax rates and taxes on transmission of wealth at death 
served primarily to level disparities between wealthier and poorer residents and limit the growth 
and maintenance of a privileged and dominant class in the society.
16
   Perceptions of worthiness 
of tax objects also changed during the last decades of the 20
th
 century.  Increasing capital 
mobility challenged the commonly-held view that income from labor should not be disfavored in 
taxation relative to income from capital
17
 and arguments prevailed holding that capital is more 
productive than labor so should be taxed at a lower rate than labor is taxed.  
As exceptional as the U.S. is in taxing its citizens, residents, and domestic corporations
18
 on their 
income from all sources worldwide,
19
 it is not uniquely burdened with the problem of wealthy 
taxpayers shifting capital and sometimes themselves to jurisdictions imposing a smaller tax 
burden on them.  Worldwide taxation makes the shift of income somewhat more difficult than it 
might be in a territorial tax country.  Despite worldwide taxation, the U.S. generally cedes 
primary taxing jurisdiction for income produced outside the U.S. to the country where the 
income is produced through a credit for foreign taxes.
20
  If the foreign taxes are lower than the 
U.S. tax, the U.S. captures a tax amount equal to the difference between the higher U.S. tax and 
the foreign tax credited.
21
 
To avoid U.S. tax, U.S. investors have two choices – one lawful, one not.  The lawful choice is to 
relinquish U.S. citizenship or, for non-citizen residents, the right to reside in the U.S.  The 
unlawful choice has been to secrete investments in foreign jurisdictions with strong bank secrecy 
laws so that income and wealth remains hidden outside U.S. taxing jurisdiction free from U.S. 
tax.  
Investors also may operate businesses through or invest in domestic or foreign corporations and 
defer individual tax on the income until the individual shareholder receives distributions or sells 
the corporate shares.  A peculiarity of the U.S. tax system permanently eliminates the individual 
tax on gain but not dividends if the shareholder dies before selling the corporate shares.  A 
decedent’s property receives a new, fair market value tax basis at the owner’s death.
22
  A foreign 
                                                 
15
 Sven-Olof Lodin, Swedish Tax Reforms 1971-77 – Why So Many?, 56 Acta Universitatis 
Stockhomiensis Studia Juridica Stockholmiensia 177, 183 (1977). 
16
 Walter J. Blum /Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 The U.Chi. 
L. Rev. 417, 487 (1952) 
17
 Andrew W. Mellon, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS 56-8 (New York 1924). 
18
 Corporate residence for U.S. tax purposes follows place of incorporation rather than seat of 
management.  I.R.C. §7701(a)(4). 
19
 I.R.C. §61 (defining gross income as all income from whatever source derived).  Treas. reg. 
§1.1-1 (worldwide taxation). 
20
 I.R.C. §901 (foreign tax credit). 
21
 I.R.C. §904 (limitation to U.S. tax on the income). 
22
 I.R.C. §1014.  
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corporation also permits the deferral of the U.S. corporate level income tax.  Even if its 
shareholders are U.S. persons, a foreign corporation is not subject to U.S. taxing jurisdiction 
except on that portion of its income from U.S. sources or effectively connected with its conduct 
of a U.S. trade or business.
23
  Most distributions of foreign source income of the foreign 
corporation to its U.S. owners become taxable in the U.S.
24
 
The U.S. has deployed an array of complex anti-avoidance rules to prevent taxpayers from 
exploiting corporate limitations on U.S. taxation of foreign source income.  Some income of 
controlled foreign corporations (CFC)
25
 is taxable to the corporation’s U.S. shareholders
26
 if the 
use of the foreign corporation to earn the foreign source income serves no logical business 
purpose. Thus, passive investment income as well as sales and service income unrelated to the 
CFC’s country of incorporation
27
 trigger the inclusion to the shareholders as if the CFC were a 
tax transparent entity similar to a partnership.
28
  U.S. persons who invest in foreign investment 
companies may defer inclusion of the foreign investment company’s income but when they sell 
their interests in the foreign company or receive distributions, the gain does not enjoy 
preferential rates on capital gains and the gains and dividends become subject to an interest 
charge.
29
  A decedent’s estate does not get a new basis in foreign investment company shares so 
                                                 
23
 I.R.C. §881 (fixed and determinable periodic income); I.R.C. §882 (effectively connected 
income). 
24
 Recent change in the U.S. tax rules by the unnamed tax act commonly referred to as the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“TCJA”), permitting some 
distributions from foreign corporations to their domestic corporate U.S. owners to remain 
permanently free from the U.S. income tax do not apply to distributions to individuals.  I.R.C. 
§245A (providing a 100 percent dividends received deduction for distributions to domestic 
corporations which are U.S. shareholders.  A U.S. shareholder is defined as shareholder who 
owns, directly or by attribution, 10 percent of the voting or value interests in the corporation. 
I.R.C. §951(b)).  Further  changes made by the TCJA have layered new complexity to limit 
deferral of income from intangible property (I.R.C. §951A (global intangible income) and I.R.C. 
§250 (foreign derived intangible income) and related party transactions (I.R.C. §59A (base 
erosion alternative tax). 
25
 I.R.C. §957 (defining CFC as a corporation in which U.S. shareholders, defined supra note 24, 
own more than half the voting power and share value). 
26
 Under I.R.C. §951(b), U.S. shareholder is a term of art and refers to a shareholder who owns 
ten percent of the voting rights or value of the CFC. 
27
 Foreign base company income is subpart F income under I.R.C. §952 included to the 
shareholders under I.R.C. §951(a).  I.R.C. §954(a) (foreign base company income). 
28
 I.R.C. §951(a).   Inclusion of CFC income is not fully transparent.  Subpart F income that 
would have been capital gain to the corporation does not retain its character as capital gain to the 
U.S. shareholders. 
29
 I.R.C. §1291 (income from a passive foreign investment company defined in I.R.C. §1297).  A 
taxpayer may avoid the unfavorable effect of these rules by electing to include the income of the 
foreign company in U.S. income annually. I.R.C. §1295 (qualified electing fund); I.R.C. §1293 
(inclusion of prorata share of qualified electing fund income). 
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the estate’s beneficiaries remain subject to the interest charge on the increase in value of the 
investment in the foreign investment company.
30
  U.S. corporations converting to foreign 
corporations to avoid U.S. taxation on their foreign source income are subject to the anti-
inversion provisions
31
 subjecting them to continuing taxation of their income in the U.S. 
The unlawful option of concealing income and income producing assets in a low tax, bank 
secrecy jurisdiction came under intense attack with the enactment of the Foreign Accounts Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010.
32
  That legislation imposed substantial penalties on U.S. 
taxpayers who failed to disclose their foreign accounts and pay tax on their income from those 
accounts.  That act also sanctioned foreign financial institutions accepting accounts from U.S. 
taxpayers not reported to U.S. taxing authorities by preventing them from participating in U.S. 
programs, including reduced withholding on investments in the U.S., a feature important to the 
institution’s underlying non-U.S. investors. 
Despite the U.S.’s exceptionalism in imposing worldwide taxation, U.S. persons historically 
valued their status as citizens and permanent residents of the U.S.  The U.S. no longer may rely 
on its citizens and residents wishing to continue to be citizens and residents.  Stable governments 
and developed banking and communication systems in low tax jurisdictions make U.S. 
citizenship or the right to reside permanently less compelling than they once were.  Expatriation 
for wealthy individuals has become an alternative to continued citizenship or residence when it 
diminishes the individual’s tax burden substantially.
33
  High net worth individuals’ sources of 
income have globalized. U.S. source income remains taxable in the U.S. even after expatriation 
but foreign source income is not.  Some income follows the residence of its owner and becomes 
foreign source following expatriation.  Unrealized gain on corporate stock, bonds, collectibles, 
gemstones, and artwork would have been U.S. source if realized and recognized before a U.S. 
person’s expatriation.  If recognition is deferred until after expatriation, its source shifts to the 
new residence of the owner
34
 and it becomes free from U.S. tax.   
In countries with territorial taxation and the U.S. with its worldwide taxation, legislatures have 
designed tax rules to discourage change of residence or expatriation and retain tax revenue by 
subjecting some or all of the taxpayer’s income to tax following change of residence or 
expatriation.  Legislation takes the form of either a continuation tax or an exit tax.  The U.S. has 
                                                 
30
 I.R.C. §1291(e). 
31
 I.R.C. §7874 (taxing all or part of a foreign entity’s income in the U.S. either as if it were a 
U.S. entity or under a continuation tax follow expatriation of the entity). 
32
 124 Stat. 71, Pub. L. 97-117 (2010). 
33
 The IRS publishes a list of expatriating individuals quarterly.  The numbers of expatriates 
moderated somewhat in 2018.  IRS, Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen To 
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 83 FR 58321 (11/19/18).   Henry Ordower, The 
Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, the Macomber Conundrum
 
and Doubtful 
Constitutionality, 15 Pitt Tax Rev 1, 6 (2017).    
34
 I.R.C. §865 (personal property sourced at residence). 
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used both.  A continuation tax imposes an obligation on the taxpayer to pay tax on some or all of 
the taxpayer’s income following the change of the taxpayer’s residence or citizenship.
35
  Most 
continuation taxes have durational limits, commonly five or ten years.  The U.S. tax had a ten 
year durational limit.
36
  An exit tax imposes a single incident of taxation on the taxpayer’s 
deferred income or unrealized gain at the moment of expatriation.
37
  Payment of all or part of the 
tax may be deferred if the taxpayer assures payment of the tax through a bond or a third party 
payer of the income to the taxpayer through withholding.
38
  Tax administration also has the 
power to certify seriously tax delinquent individuals to the Department of State for revocation or 
denial of issuance of the individual’s passport
39
 and for certain non-residents aliens, tax 
clearance is a condition for exiting the U.S.
40
 
II.  Investors and Investor Immigrants.   
Tax on investment income from U.S. sources by non-citizen, non-resident taxpayers is collected 
through a withholding tax of thirty percent of the gross payment.
41
  Double tax treaties often 
reduce that rate of tax on interest, dividends, and other investment income.  To encourage foreign 
investors to invest in U.S. government and corporate  debt, the U.S. reduced the rate of the 
                                                 
35
 Ordower, supra note 33, at 7. Sweden has a continuation tax under which it taxes some 
expatriates on income from personal property for ten years following change of residence.  3 ch. 
19 § Inkomstskattlag (Svensk fӧrfattningssamling [SFS] 1999:1229) (Swed.) (taxing Swedish 
citizens and permanent residents who leave Sweden on income from capital). Similarly, 
Germany has a ten-year continuation tax based on tax avoidance intent as described in Daniel 
Gutmann, La lutte contre “l’exil fiscal”: du droit comparé à la politique fiscale, Le Cercle des 
fiscalistes (May 24, 2012), http://www.lecercledesfiscalistes.com/publication/la-lutte-contre-
lexil-fiscal-du-droit-compare-a-la-politique-fiscale/234.  
36
 I.R.C. §877(d)(2). 
37
 Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1087 (1996) (analyzing various proposals 
to counteract the tax loss from expatriation with the income tax and the transfer tax systems). 
38
 I.R.C. §877A (expatriation tax).  The French expatriation tax was determined to violate the 
E.U. treaty when applied to a French national moving within the E.U. but possibly not when 
relocating to Switzerland.  Code général des impôts (Tax Code) art. 167a (Fr.) (as in effect in 
1999). The European Court of Justice in Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. 
Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2452, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:138, but in Christian Picart v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics, 
C-355/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:184, the ECJ determined that the 1999 E.U.-Switzerland agreement 
on free movement of persons doesn't preclude France from imposing exit tax on the unrealized 
gains of taxpayer who moved to Switzerland but was not engaged in a trade or business there. 
39
 I.R.C. §7345 (certification under section 32101 of the FAST Act, Pub.L. 114-94 (2015) 
enacted as a revenue offset). 
40
 I.R.C. §6851(d), IRS, Departing Alien Clearance (Sailing Permit), available at 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/departing-alien-clearance-sailing-permit.  
41
 I.R.C. §871 (tax on fixed, determinable, annual or periodic income). 
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withholding tax to zero while retaining the rule that a  foreign investor otherwise does not file a 
U.S. tax return or pay a tax on that U.S. source income.
42
 
State and local governmental units have offered a variety of direct and tax subsidies to induce the 
enterprises planning to build a facility in the U.S. to choose a specific locale.  The practice of tax 
subsidy competition has generated a robust bidding process among states and localities in the 
U.S. often with questionable returns to the locality in exchange for considerable loss of tax 
revenue.  The subsidies often do not require a permanent commitment from the enterprise and 




Some low tax jurisdictions have competed actively for investor capital by offering bank secrecy 
and low or no income tax on the earnings of non-residents.  The OECD targeted these 
jurisdictions as engaging in harmful tax practices in a 1998 initiative
44
 leading to increased 
transparency and information sharing by the targeted jurisdictions. A second initiative on base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) has continued the effort to achieve greater transparency with 
uniformity in tax rules to prevent arbitrage especially through use of hybrid structures.
45
 
Such international efforts to limit tax competition may have motivated investors to become 
immigrants seeking the most favorable living and investment bases rather than simply moving 
capital.  An emerging international competition issue has focused on “golden” visas and money 
laundering and similar concerns surrounding their issuance.
46
  Rather than offering tax or direct 
subsidies for investment, countries with golden visa regimes expedite the immigration process 
for investors who bring substantial investment capital to the receiving country.   
Investor immigrants invest designated minimal amounts in the receiving country in exchange for 
the privilege to enter and reside there.
47
  Some Caribbean island states even exchange immediate 
                                                 
42
 I.R.C. §871(h) added  by section 127 of Pub. L. 98-369 (Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984).(1984). 
43
 Henry Ordower, Les Impôts Relatifs aux Investissements Étrangers aux États-Unis 
d'Amérique (observations générales), 1996-2 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 185 
(1996). 
44
 Gabriel Makhlouf , Current Status of OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative A statement by 




 OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (updated frequently) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/.  
46
 For example, Ceylan Yeginsu, What Are Britain’s ‘Golden Visas,’ and Why Are They Being 
Suspended?, The New York Times (Dec. 6, 2018) available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/europe/uk-golden-visa-suspended.html (expressing 
concerning about Russian oligarchs’ use of the British program for money laundering). 
47
 Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse, supra note 2, Christians, Buying In, supra note 2. 
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citizenship for a fee rather than an investment commitment.
48
   The amounts and industries in 
which the investments must be made are not uniform among countries. Economically developed 
countries like the U.S. require a larger investment commitment than do countries looking to 
capture international capital to assist the country’s lagging economic development.
49
  Several 
countries also provide investor immigrants with temporarily favored tax treatment.
50
  Others are 
low tax jurisdictions that welcome investors from high tax jurisdictions who may wish to avoid 
or evade taxes in their home countries by changing their residence or even citizenship to avoid 
home country taxes.
51
  Investor immigrants are desired and desirable.  They do not take jobs 
from long term residents or citizens and their investments may create jobs.  Competition among 
countries for investor immigrants is robust. 
Investor immigrants to the U.S. are subject to general U.S. taxing jurisdiction under the U.S. 
worldwide taxation system when they become U.S. residents.  Immigration is only practical from 
a taxing perspective for investors subject to taxes equal to or higher than U.S. taxes in the 
country from which they are emigrating, since all their income becomes subject to U.S. tax with 
a credit for foreign taxes.  Where their emigration jurisdiction has lower taxes than the U.S., 
investor visas are desirable only from non-tax perspectives – opportunities, lifestyle, safety, etc.  
As investors they enjoy the tax advantages currently favoring capital over labor in the U.S., 
including the absence of any social security tax on income from capital,
52
 preferential rates for 
net capital gain and dividends,
53
 deferral of inclusion in income of appreciation in the value of 
their property,
54
 rapid tax recovery of many capital expenditures,
55
 and a deduction of twenty 
percent of the income from the conduct of a trade or business in the U.S.
56
 
III. Educated and Skilled Labor. 
1.  Skilled immigrants.   Countries also tend to welcome individuals with specific skills in a 
variety of fields as immigrants or temporary workers.  The U.S. has many immigration priority 
programs for educated and skilled workers.
57
   Jobs for individuals with skills or training often 
                                                 
48
 Adim,  supra note 2, at 122. 
49
 Christians, supra note 2, at 57. 
50
 Id. at 51 (discussing Italy’s new program, and comparison with Portugal, Malta, Ireland). 
51
 See discussion of FATCA legislation in the U.S., supra note 32, and the harmful tax 
competition and BEPS initiatives of the OECD, supra notes 44 and 45,   
52
 I.R.C. §3101 (6.2 percent tax on wages); I.R.C. §1401 (tax on self-employment income). 
53
 I.R.C. §1(h) (maximum rate on net capital gains and dividends). 
54
 I.R.C. §1001 (gain from sale or other disposition of property). 
55
 I.R.C. §168(k) (bonus depreciation). 
56
 I.R.C. §199A (qualified business income deduction).  Added by TCJA, the deduction violates 
principles of horizontal equity by favoring individuals who are business owners over employed 
individuals. 
57
 For example, USCIS, H-1B Specialty Occupations (available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-
dod-cooperative-research-and-development-project-workers-and-fashion-model) . 
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pay better than jobs in the immigrant’s country of origin.  Like investor immigrants, skilled 
immigrants are subject to the general taxing jurisdiction of the U.S. on their worldwide income.  
Unlike investor immigrants, skilled immigrants receive payment for services and do not enjoy 
the advantages of the current U.S. preference for income from capital.  Since their visa status is 
job dependent, they cannot convert their status into independent contractors who might capture 
the new twenty percent deduction for income from the conduct of a trade or business.
58
  They 
must pay social security taxes but, for those with high demand skills, wages are likely to exceed 
the social security earnings cap so they will not pay social security tax on all wages.
59
  
Employers may be able to offer various deferred compensation arrangements and, for some 
occupations provide non-taxable benefits including housing and meals.
60
  High wages may give 
the workers the opportunity to accumulate disposable income for investment enabling the 
workers to become investors. 
2.  Skilled emigrants.  Economically developing countries educate promising young citizens at 
government expense to develop an indigenous pool of skilled and educated workers.  Those 
individuals are among the most desired candidates for immigration to economically developed 
countries where their skills also are needed.  Salaries higher than what they would receive in 
their home country and better opportunities for family members are seductive despite any 
privileges their education might afford them at home.  Emigration thwarts home country plans 
for those individuals to fulfill important societal roles and move the country’s development.  
Preventing them from emigrating as controlled economies like Cuba and the former Soviet 
Union did raises human rights concerns.  But these privileged individuals have consumed 
considerable amounts from limited national wealth to become who they are. Repayment in some 
manner may be appropriate.
61
  Other countries impose a special fee or tax requiring an emigrant 




                                                 
58
 I.R.C. §199A (qualified business income), supra note 56.  
59
 I.R.C. §3101.  In 2018, wages in excess of $128,400 are free from the social security tax. 
Those who never become permanent residents are unlikely to draw any benefits under the social 
security system. 
60
 I.R.C. §119 (exclusion from gross income of meals and lodging provided for the convenience 
of the employer). 
61
 In the U.S., the military offers programs to pay for education for individuals if they are willing 
to commit to serve for several years following degree completion. For example, U.S. Army, Earn 
Your Degree Through ROTC, available at https://www.goarmy.com/benefits/education-
benefits/earn-your-degree-through-rotc.html.  
62
 There is considerable academic literature on this topic:  Tito Boeri/Herbert Brucker/Frederic 
Doquier/Hillel Rapoport, eds. BRAIN DRAIN AND BRAIN GAIN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION TO 
ATTRACT HIGH-SKILLED MIGRANTS (Oxford, 2012); Gillian Block/ Michael Blake, Debating 
Brain Drain May Governments Restrict Emigration? (Oxford, 2015); and literature cited supra 
note 7. 
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IV. Fungible Labor and other Authorized and Unauthorized Immigrants.  Many jobs 
require limited skills and training.  The workers are substantially fungible.  While unskilled jobs 
require some training -- even specialized training in many instances –, the necessary skills are 
relatively easy to learn and the shift from one unskilled job to another carries a low retraining 
cost.  Unlike skilled and educated workers, fungible workers receive limited amounts of 
nontaxable fringe benefits.  Most are subject to wage taxes on all their income because they do 
not earn more than the social security tax ceiling.  They spend the bulk of their income on 
necessaries so they have little ability to accumulate wealth.  In countries with value added taxes, 
substantially all the workers’ income are subject to value added as well as the wage taxes.  
Fungible workers make up the bulk of the taxpaying public, bear the burden of paying for 
government,
63
 and are affected most profoundly as tax burdens shift from capital to labor. 
Included in the pool of fungible labor are immigrants other than those who are investors or have 
special skills.   Developed economies tend to limit the number of immigrants each year – 
admitting far fewer than the number of individuals wanting admission.  The U.S. admits under a 
system of priorities generally favoring family members of those already in the U.S.,
64
 and some 
under a diversity lottery-based system.
65
  Once immigrants reside in the U.S., their incomes are 
subject to the income tax, wages to social security and Medicare taxes, and they pay state 
consumption taxes – sales and use – when they use the income to buy the items necessary for 
living.  Economically developed countries also tend to have economic refugees from less 
developed economies whose residence in the country is without official authorization.  
In the U.S. low wage earners qualify for a negative income tax
66
 on their earned income.
67
  The 
credit is substantial
68
 but as the taxpayer’s income increases, the credit rapidly phases-out.
69
  The 
credit does not help unemployed individuals and the phase-out effectively imposes an additional 
21 percent tax on increases in wages in the phase-out range.  Taxpayers lose the credit if they 
have income from capital exceeding a low threshold, thus discouraging any accumulation of 
wealth by low income individuals.
70
  Fear of IRS examination may discourage taxpayers from 
                                                 
63
 Supra, note 15 and accompanying text. 
64
 USCIS, Green Card Eligibility Categories available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/eligibility-categories, supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
65
 USCIS, Green Card Through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/diversity-visa.  
66
 I.R.C. §32 (inflation adjusted, refundable credit designed originally to balance the social 
security tax).  
67
 I.R.C. §32(c)(2) (wages plus self-employment income). 
68
 I.R.C. §32(b)(as much as 45 percent of the taxpayer’s earned income not exceeding $14,570 in 
2019 if the taxpayer has 3 or more qualifying children). 
69
 Id.  The phase-out is 21.06 percent of each dollar over $24,820 for married taxpayers filing 
jointly.  See Rev. Proc. 2018-57, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-18-57.pdf, for 
a full set of credit and phase-out tables. 
70
 I.R.C. §32(i)(2) (threshold amount in 2019 is $3600, see id. Rev. Proc. 2018-57). 
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claiming the credit since such taxpayers are examined more frequently than taxpayers with much 
greater incomes.
71
 Taxpayers who have do not have social security numbers are ineligible for the 
credit even if they have alternate taxpayer identification
72
 and otherwise meet the qualifications 
for the credit. Thus, unauthorized workers may pay social security and income taxes but may not 
claim the earned income credit. 
In many societies, there are tasks that citizens and permanent residents are reluctant to perform.  
The tasks are not difficult to learn and often do not require knowledge of the country’s language.  
In some countries without a domestic sub-class of workers,
73
 limited and temporary immigration 
may provide workers to fill those occupations.  In the U.S., for example, migrant farm workers 
mostly from Mexico and Central America handle much harvest work and in the Gulf States, 
temporary, non-citizen workers make up the majority of the work force without gaining rights of 
residence or citizenship.
74
 Unauthorized immigration provides an additional supply of fungible 
workers. 
Unauthorized immigrants are subject to deportation at any moment and have little hope of 
gaining authorized status.  Unless they secure false papers or alternative taxpayer identification,
75
 
unauthorized immigrants may not accept work in the formal economy of their country of 
residence.  They participate primarily in the informal economy in which they receive payment 
for their services or goods they sell in cash or in barter goods and services. Generally they have 
to accept payments for their services at rates substantially below the formal economy market 
rate.
76
  Such service value discounts are necessary to entice service recipients to use 
                                                 
71
 Paul Kiel/Jesse Eisinger/Propublica, The Golden Age of Rich People Not Paying Their Taxes, 




 The U.S. issues individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITIN) on request to individuals not 
authorized to work in the U.S. but who have income to report in the U.S.  IRS, Instructions for 
Form W-7 (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw7.pdf).  
73
 India, for example, has a domestic sub-class in the Dalit group even though the Indian 
constitution provides equality of status and opportunity.  Constitution of India, Preamble and Art. 
14, available at https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf.  See 
generally, Dalit Solidarity, available at https://www.dalitsolidarity.org/dalits-and-
untoucchability.html.   
74
 For example, in Qatar more than 80 percent of the work force is non-Qatari.  Ben Hubbard, 
That Punishing Blockade? ‘We’ve Moved On,’ Qatar Says, The New York Times (Dec. 19, 
2018) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/middleeast/qatar-blockade-
goods.html. 
75
 Supra note 72, U.S. taxpayer identification, for example. 
76
 The informal (or underground economy) operates primarily in cash outside the banking system 
and government regulation.  Workers are paid at below market rates and have no little or no job 
protection.  See, generally, International Labour Organization, More than 60 per cent of the 
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unauthorized workers’ services rather than those offered in the formal market.  Unauthorized 
workers frequently find employment in occupations in which supplies of authorized workers are 
inadequate or in which authorized workers do not wish to participate.  Many unauthorized 
workers are in household occupations where their employer is in need of the services but is 
unwilling or unable to pay formal market rates.  The payments generally would yield no tax 
deduction for the employer so payments in cash outside the formal economy are not of any 
consequence.
77
   
Many unauthorized workers without tax identification do not report their income for income tax 
purposes.  Failure to report income poses risks of both civil and criminal penalties since their 
obligation to report and pay taxes is independent of immigration status.  If they were authorized 
workers, the incomes of many would lie below the threshold at which an income tax otherwise 
might be payable
78
 but, in most instances, a wage-based social security tax would be payable.  In 
the U.S. such low income workers if authorized to work in the U.S. might qualify for the earned 
income credit.
79
 Thus, they are disadvantaged relative to authorized workers both in wage levels 
and access to a low wage tax benefit.  While many unauthorized immigrants may not pay an 
income tax, they do pay consumption taxes
80
 and excise taxes as they consume and indirectly 
pay property taxes in their housing rent.   
V.  Conclusion: Tax Shift from Capital to Labor:  Does Immigration Matter? 
Taxation plays a role in immigration and emigration and seems to drive some decisions to 
migrate from high to low tax jurisdictions. Capital mobility and labor immobility argue in favor 
of decreasing taxes on capital to prevent capital flight even if the decrease means shifting tax 
burdens to labor. Decreased taxes on capital, however, do not guarantee that capital will not flee.  
Another jurisdiction may offer still lower taxes and generate conditions for tax decrease 
competition, depriving the taxing jurisdiction of needed revenue.  A race to the bottom on capital 
taxes enhances disparities between wealthy and poor residents and is unlikely to benefit 
                                                                                                                                                             
world’s employed population are in the informal economy (Apr 8, 2018), available at 
https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_627189/lang--en/index.htm.  
77
 Homecare workers for children, infirm and aged individuals, for examples, generally non-
deductible in any event as a personal expense under I.R.C. §262 or offering a tax credit less 
valuable than the lower wages in the informal economy even in those instances in which a credit 
is available. I.R.C. §21. 
78
 The income tax system of each developed economy does not tax incomes that fall below a 
minimum amount.  That amount differs from country to country.  In the U.S., the standard 
deduction under I.R.C. §63 currently is $12,000 so that incomes less than that amount are not 
taxable.  In Germany, a subsistence minimum must remain free from the income tax under the 




 Supra note 66 and accompanying text. I.R.C. §32. 
80
 The US has no national consumption tax but most of the states of the U.S. have retail sales 
taxes. 
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developed economies. Growth of a privileged class undercuts longstanding commitments in 
advanced democracies to equality and equal opportunity.  
Other methods to stop capital flight are appealing. FATCA
81
 in the U.S. to prevent concealment 
of wealth offshore, continuation and expatriation taxes, robust transfer pricing limitations that 
allocate and tax income where it is produced all prevent the shift of income to low tax 
jurisdictions and deprive movement of capital and people of anticipated tax benefits.  Formulary 
apportionment of worldwide income properly allocating income among jurisdictions might even 
eliminate the benefit of artificial income shifting without having to compromise longstanding 
policies concerning distribution of tax burdens.
82
   
Ability to pay as a fundamental principle of taxation and resulting redistribution of wealth 
through strong welfare systems that provide for the needs of all remain as compelling today as 
they were when many economically developed countries chose to impose steeply progressive 
taxes.  Yet the focus on competing for capital resources seems to have supplanted principles of 
fairness and ability to pay and resulted in increasingly flat or regressive taxation.  Tax rate 
competition for capital seems a doubtful strategy heading toward a zero tax on capital income 
and raises the question of whether something else motivates countries to shift tax burdens from 
capital to labor. 
During the period in which tax rates at the top have declined, estate taxes decreased or 
disappeared and regressive wage and value added taxes became more central to revenue 
production, there also has been growing pressure on economically developed countries to accept 
immigrants from economically weak and developing countries.  In many instances the newer 
immigrants look different and may follow different religions and cultural customs from those of 
the populace of the destination country.  Perhaps those differences cause the citizenry of the 
destination country to be less welcoming to that immigrant population, less committed to 
redistribution of wealth when the distributees differ from the distributors, less willing to share 
their wealth with an unfamiliar immigrant population and more willing to accept less progressive 
taxation making the immigrant population pay for its own welfare consumption even if the loss 
of progressivity affects many citizens and long term residents adversely as well. 
At times immigrants may be perceived to consume a disproportional share of public assistance as 
they integrate, fail to integrate, or are prevented from integrating into their new country.
83
  In 
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 Supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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Rev. 361 (2013). 
83
 Moritz Marbach/ Jens Hainmueller/Dominik Hangartner,  The Long-Term Impact of 
Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees (August 1, 2018). Stanford-Zurich 
Immigration Policy Lab Working Paper No. 17-03; Stanford University Graduate School of 
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welfare states where the fundamental decision to use high taxes to fund broad public assistance 
was made many years earlier for a homogeneous society, resentment of immigrants who differ 
but draw those benefits may be unsurprising.
84
  As demand for entry and assistance from diverse 
cultural groups grows, resentment and concomitantly anti-immigrant political presence has 
become increasingly vociferous even when not politically successful.
85
  Perhaps the shift of taxes 
from capital to labor is also about cultural diversification – a question bearing examination. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerning the temporary ban on refugee employment in Germany: “[a] marginal social cost 
analysis for the study sample suggests that this employment ban cost German taxpayers about 40 
million Euros per year, on average, in terms of welfare expenditures and forgone tax revenues 
from unemployed refugees.”  
84
 During development of the Swedish welfare state, the population was almost wholly white and 
Christian.  Roth /Hertzberg, supra note 5, at 11 (well over half the foreign born in Sweden were 
Scandinavians and the rest almost exclusively while European). 
85
 BBC News, Europe and nationalism: A country-by-country guide (September 10, 2018), 
available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 (showing penetrations of the 
anti-immigrant parties in recent European elections). 
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